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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In an earlier case, a jury found twenty-three-year-old Cody William Parmer guilty 
of felony battery with intent to commit a serious felony - rape. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with six years fixed, and placed him on 
probation. As a result of the conviction, Mr. Parmer was required to register as a 
sex offender. Later, the State alleged that he had failed to change his address or report 
to the Sheriff's Department as required by the sex offender registration statute. 
In the present case, Mr. Parmer was accused of felony failure to register as a sex 
offender. He filed a motion to dismiss the failure to register charge, which the district 
court denied. Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Parmer then pleaded guilty 
to the failure to register charge. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five 
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Parmer asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In Kootenai County No. CR 2010-6509, a jury found Mr. Parmer guilty of battery 
with intent to commit a serious felony - rape, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-903 and 18-911. 
(R., pp.9, 35, 52.) The jury found Mr. Parmer not guilty of rape. (R., p.35, 51.) The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with six years fixed, and 
placed him on probation. (See R., pp.9, 68.) As a result of the conviction, Mr. Parmer 
was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to I.C. § 18-8304(a). (R., p.9.) 
Mr. Parmer filed a timely appeal of the conviction. 1 (R., p.35.) 
1 The Idaho Court of Appeals later affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Parmer, 
No. 39203, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 665 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2013). 
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Later, the State filed an Affidavit in Support of Probable Cause with attachments 
setting forth facts that allegedly established probable cause to charge Mr. Parmer with a 
violation of his duty to update registration requirements. (R., pp.6-12.) The police 
report attached to the affidavit alleged that Mr. Parmer was homeless, and that he had 
failed to change his address or report to the Sheriff's Department as required by the sex 
offender registration statute. (R., pp.9-10.) The magistrate, after examining the 
affidavit, found probable cause and ordered that a warrant be issued for Mr. Parmer's 
arrest. (R., p.13.) 
In this case, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Parmer had 
committed the crime of failure to register as a sex offender, felony, in violation of Idaho 
Code§§ 18-8309 and 18-8311. (R., pp.14-15.) He was also charged with probation 
violations in No. CR 2010-6509. (See Tr., p.5, Ls.17-20.) After Mr. Parmer waived the 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound Mr. Parmer over to the district court. 
(R., pp.23-24.) The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Parmer with the above 
offense. (R., pp.25-26.) Mr. Parmer entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. 
(R., pp.27-29.) 
Mr. Parmer subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss requesting that the district 
court dismiss the failure to register charge. (R., pp.34-40.) In the motion to dismiss, 
Mr. Parmer asserted that it may be assumed that the failure to register charge was 
predicated upon his conviction for battery with intent to commit a serious felony in No. 
CR 2010-6509. (R., pp.34-35.) Because the conviction was timely appealed and the 
Mr. Parmer has filed a Petition for Review requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court 
review the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion. Petition for Review, State v. Parmer, No. 
39203 (Idaho Oct. 8, 2013). 
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question of the validity of the conviction was pending at the time the motion was filed, 
he submitted that the failure to register charge should be dismissed. (R., p.35.) 
Mr. Parmer also stated that the district court found that he was twenty years old 
at the time of the underlying incident in No. CR 2010-6509, and the victim S.H. was 
seventeen years old. (R., p.35.) In No. CR 2010-6509, Mr. Parmer filed a motion to 
dismiss based on the legislature's amendment of I.C. § 18-6101(1), the statutory rape 
statute, effective July 1, 2010. (R., p.35.) He asserted that he could not be charged 
with a violation of I.C. § 18-6101(1), or battery with intent to commit statutory rape, 
because the amended statute could not apply given the respective ages of Mr. Parmer 
and S.H. (R., p.35.) The district court disagreed and denied that motion, relying 
primarily on I.C. § 67-513. (R., p.35.) 
Mr. Parmer asserted that battery with intent to commit a serious felony was not a 
lesser included felony of rape as charged in the information in No. CR 2010-6509, and 
thus his conviction and any resulting duty to register as a sex offender was unlawful. 
(R., p.36.) 
Additionally, Mr. Parmer asserted that the district court would be unable to 
determine whether the jury found that he committed battery with intent to commit 
forcible rape, or battery with intent to commit statutory rape. (R., pp.36-37.) The jury 
instructions permitted the jury to find battery with intent to commit forcible rape or 
battery with intent to commit statutory rape. (R., pp.36-37.) The jury returned a general 
verdict. (R., p.37.) Thus, the district court would be unable to determine whether the 
jury found that he committed battery with intent to commit forcible rape, or battery with 
intent to commit statutory rape. (R., p.37.) 
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Mr. Parmer further asserted that even if he could be prosecuted for a crime that 
no longer existed at the time of trial, he was entitled to the benefit of an ameliorative 
sentencing amendment. (R., p.37.) At the time of the trial and sentencing in No. 
CR 2010-6509, "statutory rape (I.C. [§ 18-6501(1)]) under the facts adduced at trial was 
no longer a crime. Battery with Intent to Commit such a crime could no longer be a 
felony conviction subject to the strictures of sex offender registration." (R., p.38.) Thus, 
any requirement to register predicated on such conviction was unlawful and could not 
serve as the basis for a failure to register charge. (R., p.38.) He based this argument 
on State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 263 (Ct. App. 1998), where the Idaho Court of Appeals 
determined that the defendant was entitled to be sentenced under the law in effect at 
the time of sentencing, not the law in effective at the time of commission of the crime. 
(R., pp.37-38.) 
Even if a registration requirement were lawful, Mr. Parmer asserted that he was 
entitled to relief from registration. (R., p.38.) I.C. § 18-8304(4) (2009) allowed for a 
defendant convicted of statutory rape who was nineteen or twenty at the time of the 
offense and not more than three years older than the victim to be exempted from the 
duty to register as a sex offender. (R., p.38.) I.C. § 18-8304(4) (2009) allowed for the 
exemption if the court found that the defendant demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that he was not a risk to commit another statutory rape, and in the case there 
were no allegations by the victim of any violation of the other subsections of the rape 
statute. (R., p.38.) 
Mr. Parmer asserted that I.C. § 18-8304(4) (2009) must be applied to his case. 
(R., p.38.) He had requested a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to 
exemption, "and noted that the predication of a registration requirement on mere 
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allegations of violation of [the other subsections of the rape statute] was an 
unconscionable violation of fundamental due process." (R., p.38.) The burden of 
showing Mr. Parmer was not a risk to commit another statutory rape "certainly would 
require psycho-sexual evaluation that Mr. Parmer had and has the right to refuse, and 
certainly retains during the pendency of his appeal and the possibility of retrial." 
(R., p.39.) Thus, Mr. Parmer submitted that "the instant prosecution is in one sense a 
punishment for his assertion of a basic constitutional right to remain silent." (R., pp.39-
40.) 
The State then filed a Brief Opposing Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.44-50.) In the 
brief, the State argued that a criminal defendant charged with failure to register as a sex 
offender is not generally permitted to collaterally attack a prior judgment of conviction. 
(R., p.45.) A prior judgment is presumed to be valid, and the presumption is rebuttable 
only when the defendant provides proof of violation of a constitutional right. (R., p.46.) 
The State argued that Mr. Parmer did not present an argument based on constitutional 
rights violations. (R., p.47.) "Instead, the motion to dismiss presents legal issues fully 
addressed and litigated in the underlying case or issues that are still before the Idaho 
appeals courts." (R., p.47.) 
The State also argued that the judgment in No. CR 2010-5609 was in effect 
because execution of the sentence had not been stayed by the district court or the 
Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p.47.) Thus, Mr. Parmer was required to register as a sex 
offender. (R., p.47.) 
Additionally, the State argued that I.C. § 18-8304, which requires anyone 
convicted of battery with intent to commit rape to register as a sex offender, does not 
distinguish between different theories of rape. (R., pp.47-48.) While Mr. Parmer 
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claimed that he was convicted of battery with intent to commit statutory rape, battery 
with intent to commit statutory rape "is logically inconsistent because it would require a 
defendant to commit an unwanted touching in order to have consensual sex with the 
person he battered. (R., pp.48-49.) "Consequently, battery with the intent to rape must 
be considered to be battery with the intent to commit forcible rape." (R., p.49.) 
The State further argued that the fact that Mr. Parmer had been convicted of 
battery with intent to commit rape was enough to establish a duty to register as a sex 
offender. (R., p.49.) The verdict form did not question the jury as to what theory it used 
to convict Mr. Parmer of battery with intent to commit rape, and there was no way to 
know which theory the jury used to convict Mr. Parmer. (R., p.49; see R., pp.51-52.) 
According to the State, the theory used "is irrelevant to the question of whether the 
defendant has a duty to register as a sex offender because the crime for which he was 
convicted is delineated in the applicable registry statute with no applicable exclusions." 
(R., pp.49-50.) Thus, the State requested that the district court deny the motion to 
dismiss. (R., p.50.) 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Parmer asserted that the case was 
in a unique situation because the appeal in No. CR 2010-6509 was still pending before 
the Idaho Court of Appeals. (Tr., p.6, Ls.9-11.) Between the time that Mr. Parmer was 
charged with rape and the time he went to trial, the legislature changed the rape statute 
in a way "to provide that, given the ages of particular individuals involved in this matter, 
what would have been statutory rape prior to July 1st of that year became not statutory 
rape given the ages of the individuals involved." (Tr., p.6, L.17- p.7, L.1.) Because of 
the way the jury was instructed, "we do not know what theory upon which they 
predicated their decision because [Mr. Parmer] was charged in the alternative. First 
6 
with forcible rape, then with - and/or, as the state has want to do, with statutory rape." 
(Tr., p.7, Ls.9-13.) Pursuant to State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 263 (Ct. App. 1998), 
Mr. Parmer asserted that "if indeed there is an ameliorate change in the punishment for 
that law, you must apply the ameliorative change to the conviction in this circumstance." 
(Tr., p.7, Ls.20-25.) The jury instructions and the verdict form allowed the jury to report 
a verdict on either battery with intent to commit forcible rape or battery with intent to 
commit statutory rape, "so we don't know which one is correct." (Tr., p.8, Ls.12-16.) 
Mr. Parmer then addressed the State's brief opposing the motion to dismiss, 
asserting that he could make a collateral attack on the underlying conviction because he 
"raised a constitutional issue. That constitutional issue being a fundamental structural 
defect in the proceedings. . . . That fundamental procedural defect, sir, is that this jury 
returned a verdict on a general verdict on battery with intent. We don't know which 
theory they returned their verdict as to." (Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.9, L.9.) According to 
Mr. Parmer, "the fundamental constitutional right that's been violated here is 
[Mr. Parmer's] right to know, is [his] right to have a jury determine which theory, and it 
becomes extremely important as it relates to the instant case." (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-19.) If 
he were convicted of battery with intent to commit statutory rape, then Morris would 
apply and Mr. Parmer would not be punishable or required to register as a sex offender. 
(Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.2.) Thus, Mr. Parmer could make a collateral attack because he 
had raised a claim of fundamental structural error. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) 
The district court asked whether that issue had been raised in the direct appeal 
of No. CR 2010-6509, arid Mr. Parmer related that the appellate brief had only raised 
the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-23.) Thus, the appellate brief 
did not raise this issue on direct appeal. (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-5.) 
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Mr. Parmer then returned to the arguments raised in the State's brief in 
opposition, asserting that the State's conclusion that battery with the intent to commit 
rape must be battery with the intent to commit forcible rape was incorrect because of 
the way the jury was instructed. (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-25.) While the State argued that the 
theory used to convict Mr. Parmer did not matter, it did matter "because he's entitled to 
relief under a variety of theories if it is indeed battery with intent to commit statutory 
rape." (Tr., p.12, Ls.3-12.) Further, a conviction for battery with the intent to commit 
statutory rape "certainly probably doesn't require sexual registration." (Tr., p.12, Ls.22-
24.) 
The State argued, "It doesn't matter what version of what theory the jury used, 
and the main reason I say that is that 18-8304(a) lists the crimes for which a person is 
required to register. And one of those is 18-911 battery with the intent to commit rape." 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.12-17.) "It makes no distinction between battery with the intent to commit 
statutory rape, forcible rape, drug rape, any other kind of rape out there. It simply says 
rape." (Tr., p.13, Ls. 18-21.) Thus, the State argued that "even if the jury was 
instructed regarding statutory rape, it's irrelevant to whether or not [Mr. Parmer] has to 
register as a sex offender." (Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23.) 
Turning to the collateral attack issue, the State argued that Mr. Parmer's 
collateral attack was inappropriate, and if the case were "a DUI from somewhere back 
East in Maine, counsel would not have the details of that case. He would not be able to 
bring forward the jury instructions for that case and litigate whether or not something is 
a crime or that's a crime, whatever that is." (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.6.) According to 
the State, the constitutional grounds for a collateral attack were trial rights such as the 
right to counsel or right to remain silent, and Mr. Parmer was not denied his right to 
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counsel or other trial rights. (Tr., p.14, Ls.12-22.) Additional challenges to No. 
CR 2010-6509 should not be made in this case, "[s]o it's just inappropriate to be arguing 
whether or not this judgment is admissible for evidence of a conviction." (Tr., p.14, L.23 
- p.15, L.2.) 
Even if the district court were to address Mr. Parmer's substantive arguments, 
the State argued that there was evidence at trial that would lead to the conclusion that 
the crime was battery with intent to commit forcible rape. (Tr., p.15, Ls.4-7.) Further, it 
would be illogical for the jury to find that a battery-an unwanted touching-could then 
result in a consensual sexual encounter. (Tr., p.15, Ls.10-13.) "And as a result, the jury 
could not logically come to the conclusion that it was battery with the intent to commit 
statutory rape." (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-18.) Additionally, because I.C. § 18-911 did not 
distinguish between types of rape, the distinction was not appropriate for a jury 
instruction. (Tr., p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.2.) 
The State summed up the case as follows: "[Mr. Parmer] has a duty to register as 
a sex offender given a conviction resulting from a jury verdict." (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-5.) "The 
question is not what happened in that trial. If he was convicted and it was a qualifying 
offense under the 18-8304, then he's appropriately required to register, and if he didn't 
do so, then he's guilty of the felony offense for which he's charged." (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-10.) 
In reply to the State's arguments, Mr. Parmer asserted that the State's 
hypothetical about attacking a ten-year-old conviction was inapposite because that 
conviction would be final, while the judgment in No. CR 2010-6509 was not final and 
remained on appeal. (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-20.) If the jury convicted on the theory of battery 
with intent to commit statutory rape, it did matter because registration would not be 
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applicable to Mr. Parmer. (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-12.) As Mr. Parmer's trial counsel explained 
to the district court: 
Judge, this crime was charged on - in April of 2010. Law changed in July 
of 2010. Law changed to such a degree that statutory rape between the 
ages of the two individual[s], the prosecutrix and my client, was not a 
crime anymore. To require him to register as a sex offender for the rest of 
his life for something that was no longer a crime just doesn't make sense 
in an ordered system of justice, sir. 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.13-20.) 
When the district court asked if every issue raised in the motion to dismiss could 
have been raised in the appeal of No. CR 2010-6509, Mr. Parmer's trial counsel replied, 
"I have to say yes, sir." (Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.6.) The district court later stated that 
"the failure to raise those issues in the underlying appeal doesn't change the rules of 
law that I need to follow in terms of a collateral - whether a collateral attack is 
appropriate or not." (Tr., p.21, Ls.2-5.) 
So the ameliorative conditions that could be imposed, motions that can be 
based upon whatever the court of appeals does or does not do, motions to 
stay, there's any number of things that can yet be played, but I do not 
believe it would be appropriate for the Court just to grant the motion to 
dismiss. 
I think at this point, the Court has to presume that the jury verdict is 
valid and attack - and the judgment is still operative in the State of Idaho. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.6-14.) Thus, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. (R., pp.59-60; 
Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.2.) 
Later, Mr. Parmer entered into a conditional plea agreement with the State. 
(R., pp.61-63.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Parmer would plead guilty in this 
case to an Amended Information, and admit to all alleged probation violations in No. 
CR 2010-6509. (R., p.61.) Mr. Parmer retained the right to appeal the district court's 
denial of the motion to dismiss. (R., p.62.) The State then filed an Amended 
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Information charging Mr. Parmer with failure to register as a sex offender, based on his 
providing false or misleading information to the sex offender registry. (R., pp.64-65.) 
The district court accepted Mr. Parmer's guilty plea to the amended information. 
(R., p.57.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five 
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.69-72.) In No. CR 2010-
6509, the district court revoked probation, executed the underlying sentence, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.69.) The sentences would run concurrently. (R., pp.69, 71.) 
As of the date of this Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parmer is on a retained jurisdiction "rider. "2 
Mr. Parmer then filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.73-76.) 
2 See Offender Search, Idaho Department of Correction, http://www.accessidaho.org 
/public/corr/offender/search.html (in the search criteria, enter "Parmer" for the last name 
of offender, "Cody" for the first name of offender, and "100777" for the offender number) 
(last visited October 30, 2013). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Parmer's motion to dismiss? 
12 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Parmer's Motion To Dismiss 
Mr. Parmer asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to dismiss. A district court may dismiss a criminal action upon motion of any 
party if "the court concludes that such dismissal will serve the ends of justice and the 
effective administration of the court's business." I.C.R. 48(a)(2). An appellate court 
reviews a district court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 138 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The district court denied Mr. Parmer's motion to dismiss after indicating that the 
circumstances of this case did not change the rules of law governing collateral attacks. 
(See Tr., p.21, Ls.2-14.) In State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89 (2004), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that a defendant's "prior misdemeanor DUI convictions were not subject to 
collateral attack in the subsequent felony DUI proceeding." Weber, 140 Idaho at 96. 
The Weber Court observed that, "In [Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994)], the 
United States Supreme Court made it clear that a defendant's constitutional right to 
mount a collateral attack did not extend beyond situations where the prior convictions 
were obtained in violation of the right to counsel." Weber, 140 Idaho at 93-94 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court highlighted ease of 
administration and the interest in promoting the finality of judgments as policy 
considerations in support of its holding. Id. at 93. 
Thus, the Weber Court held that the defendant "had no right under the United 
States Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of his prior misdemeanor DUI 
convictions because the attack was based on grounds other than the denial of counsel." 
Id. at 94. The Court declined to interpret the Idaho Constitution as providing greater 
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protection than the federal constitutional standard. Id. Further, "the policy 
considerations articulated in Custis, though expressed in relation to the federal scheme, 
are equally relevant to state court proceedings." Id. at 95. The Court also rejected the 
defendant's argument that I.C.R. 11 (c) provided an independent basis to collaterally 
attack the validity of a prior conviction used in a subsequent enhancement proceeding. 
Id. at 95-96. 
Mindful of Custis and Weber, Mr. Parmer asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss, because the verdict form in No. 
CR 2010-6509 does not indicate whether the jury convicted Mr. Parmer of battery with 
intent to commit forcible rape or battery with intent to commit statutory rape, the conduct 
underlying No. CR 2010-6509 was no longer covered by the statutory rape statute at 
the time of trial and sentencing in that case, and a conviction for battery with intent to 
commit statutory rape would not establish a duty for Mr. Parmer to register as a 
sex offender. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Parmer respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the judgment of conviction in this case, reverse the district court's order denying his 
motion to dismiss, and remand this case to the district court with instructions to permit 
Mr. Parmer to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2013. 
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